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Elham Saeidinezhad, UCLA  
 
 
The IMF’s April 2019, World Economic Outlook has highlighted concerns about the 
sustainability of the world’s non-financial corporate debt burden and its sustainability in the 
event of a major financial shock. The IMF’s warning comes on the heels of dramatic growth in 
corporate leverage in major global economies, with the United States and China especially 
vulnerable to debt-driven deleveraging in the corporate sector in the event of a major slowdown. 
Indeed, in the United States, the corporate debt to GDP level is well above 100% while in China 
and Europe it is above 150%.1  
 
While private debt to GDP ratios are an important indicator of financial stability, it cannot paint 
a full picture of the risks to a system. What is required is an alternative set of evaluations that 
presents us with a granular picture of sectoral indebtedness and can provide regulators a deeper 
understanding of systemic vulnerabilities created by overleveraging. Such a set of metrics would 
not simply look at debt to GDP as ex-post net variables but examine the gross flows that impact 
debt sustainability. More specifically, the analysis undertaken by most of the literature on 
corporate debt depends on a measure of the sustainability of the debt – or the ability of the firm 
to pay down its debt rather than the leverage embedded in the debt structure – or the immediate 
need for liquidity in the event of a downturn. This latter measurement is especially important as 
                                                            
1
 IMF (2019) 
the 2008 financial crisis has shown us that over-dependence on net measures can blind regulators 
to global risks associated with particularly systemically important sectors.  
 
This paper will attempt to take a first step toward building such a granular framework by 
examining the sustainability of American corporate debt through sustainability analysis of 
nonfinancial corporate sectors. This it argues does not displace but rather compliments 
traditional measures used by analysts that rely on aggregated and netted metrics. By examining 
sectoral debt composition based on both dimensions of corporate indebtedness, a mixed picture 
emerges. While some sectors show more resiliency to a downturn than standard analysis implies, 
other sectors, particularly within the utilities sector, show far greater exposure to profitability and 
interest rate shocks than commonly understood. It is important to note that while this paper 
evaluates the liquidity of non-financial corporate debt sectors in response to adverse events, it 
does not examine the ultimate holders of this debt and their liquidity requirements. Therefore, it 
does not provide us with a complete picture of the systemic vulnerabilities presented by these 
instruments.  
 
 This paper will proceed as follows. First, it will present the stylized facts around the 
global growth of nonfinancial corporate debt and how it has been treated in the literature. Then it 
will proceed to examine the image of corporate debt levels are evaluated from this service 
capacity lens. After undertaking this analysis, it will undertake a sustainability analysis to 
examine how particular sectors might be more, or less vulnerable to liquidity shocks than service 
capacity might indicate.  
 
 
I. Non-Financial Corporate Debt: Some Stylized Facts 
 
Since the end of 2007, the debt-to-GDP ratio of non-financial corporate institutions has grown by 
22 percent to reach a historic level of forty-five percent while, in the same period, the financial 
stress index has moved downward (see Figure 1). This has paved the way for a self-re-enforcing 
cycle in which corporates to borrow in favorable conditions while increasing corporations’ 
reliance on U.S. monetary policy and financing conditions.
2
 As a result, many worries about 
resulting corporate balance sheets’ vulnerabilities such as increased interest expenses or a 
negative shock to corporates’ earnings due to a potential macroeconomic downturn.
3
 
 
Figure 1: Debt and Financial stress ratio 
 
 
Note:” How to Interpret the Financial Stress Index: The average value of the index, which 
begins in late 1993, is designed to be zero. Thus, zero is viewed as representing normal financial 
market conditions. Values below zero suggest below-average financial market stress, while 
values above zero suggest above-average financial market stress.” 
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index [STLFSI], 
retrieved from FRED, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/STLFSI, February 13, 2018. 
 
 
Nonfinancial corporates started shifting the composition of their debt from loans towards debt 
securities after the financial crisis (see Figure 2 a and b).
4
 However, unlike bank loans, which are 
mostly issued with floating rates, most corporate bonds have fixed coupons and are not 
vulnerable to changes in interest rates. Thus, certain changes in the composition of corporate 
debts- such as increased reliance on long-term debt and switching to fixed rate debt instruments 
– would reduce the balance sheet vulnerability. 
 
                                                            
2
 The financial stress index measures the degree of financial stress in the markets. It is constructed from 
18 weekly data series: seven interest rate series, six yield spreads and five other indicators. Each of these 
variables captures some aspect of financial stress. Accordingly, as the level of financial stress in the 
economy changes, the data series are likely to move together. 
3 IMF (2017). 
4 Since 2009, a considerable portion of the total debt accumulated is in corporate bonds and as of 
December 2017 corporate bonds make up more than 80 percent of overall corporates’ long-term debt, 
compared to 60 percent pre-crisis. 
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 Figure 2:  
a. Debt Structure of All Nonfinancial Corporations:  b. Corporate debt for 
nonfinancial firms 
% of total debt     NFC debt (in millions of dollars) 
 
 
 
 
However, an assessment of particular vulnerabilities presented by these conditions requires a 
granular examination of factors affecting sustainability e.g., debt composition, capital structure, 
and firms’ asset risk. Considering the developments documented above, sectoral profiles of 
corporate debt take on particular importance for the assessment of systemic vulnerability. To do 
this, this study goes beyond most previous studies by drawing on an expanded data to provide an 
in-depth analysis of debt sustainability on the sectoral level rather than relying on a distorted 
aggregate picture.
5
 The central role that housing sector played as a catalyst to the crisis was a 
bitter reminder that these sector-specific vulnerabilities, if not identified probably, increase both 
the likelihood and severity of the crisis. Also, with a macroeconomic condition characterized by 
ultra-low interest rate and abundance of the bond-purchasing program by Federal Reserve, 
policymakers have been concerned whether these external factors have caused a higher level of 
leverage in some of the non-financial corporate sectors.
6
 Second, standard proxies only reveal 
the degree of leverage and debt repayment capacity but provide little information on the causes 
                                                            
5 We compare corporate leverage and the factors that affect its sustainability for 12 different sectors. The 
cut offs for vulnerable, viable (moderate) and strong sectors are based on their historical distribution. The 
firms that are in >= 95 percentile and 75th- 94h percentile are considered as vulnerable, 55th-74th 
percentile have moderate risks, and lower than 15 percentiles are strong for the indicators that lower 
means the better performance. For the indicators that higher indicates a stronger financial position, 
strong firms are firms are in >= 95 percentile and 75th- 94h percentile, moderate means to be between 
55th and 74th percentile, and vulnerable means to be lower than 15 percentiles.  The aim is to compare 
each sector’s performance relative to other sectors in the economy. 
6 See IMF and OFR Financial stability reports (2017) 
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of these vulnerabilities. In contrast, the supplementary indicators provide useful insights into the 
origins of these vulnerabilities by explicitly studying balance sheet weaknesses and strengths.
7
  
 
II. Standard Measures of Corporate Debt Vulnerability 
 
The standard metrics that are used by most analysts to measure the vulnerability of debt include 
the share of debt relative to total assets, total equity and EBITDA, as well as debt accumulation,  
debt servicing capacity, proxied by interest coverage ratio, and costs of issuing new debt proxied 
by synthetic ratings.
8
 
 
These so-called “supplementary ratios” provide insights on the balance sheets strengths and 
weaknesses  more specifically around four dimensions:  the capital structure (with ratios looking 
at the share of fixed asset, and equity investment), the debt structure (with ratios capturing the 
share of long-term debt, corporate bond, bond with a maturity less than 2 years, and investment 
grade bond), the cost of debt (synthetic rating and spread) and the quality of assets (ratios 
assessing the profitability, the share of cash and tangible assets). Our results indicate that firms in 
sectors such as accommodation, real estate, utilities, and energy are more levered and often more 
vulnerable to higher borrowing cost. 
 
Table 1 shows how, supplementary ratios provide insights on the balance sheets strengths and 
weaknesses  more specifically around four dimensions:  the capital structure (with ratios looking 
at the share of fixed asset, and equity investment), the debt structure (with ratios capturing the 
share of long-term debt, corporate bond, bond with a maturity less than 2 years, and investment 
grade bond), the cost of debt (synthetic rating and spread) and the quality of assets (ratios 
assessing the profitability, the share of cash and tangible assets).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
7 Haughwout et al, (2011). 
8 See Frank and Goyal (2009) and Goyal and Packer (2016). 
  
 
 
Table 1: Summary of the indicators for Indebtedness, leverage and debt service capacities, 
(Average of 5 years) 
   
The cut-offs are based on the following percentiles of the distribution: dark red >= 95 percentile, red: 75
th
- 94h percentile, 
dark green: 0
th
-14
th
 percentile. 
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Debt	
Accumulation	
38	 27	 131	 93	 179	 60	 114	 177	 164	 138	 100	 168	
Debt	Ratio	 58	 27	 29	 31	 35	 32	 50	 30	 29	 37	 45	 19	
Leverage	 1.6	 0.5	 0.5	 0.9	 0.8	 0.7	 1	 0.8	 0.5	 0.8	 1.2	 0.6	
Debt	
Overhang	
3	 2.7	 2.6	 2.1	 2.5	 2.6	 6.4	 1.9	 2.3	 3	 4.6	 2.9	
D
e
b
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S
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u
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u
re
	
Total	Long-
Term	Debt	to	
Total	Debt	
98	 95	 93	 96	 91	 84	 84	 84	 90	 92	 88	 95	
Corporate	
Bond	to	Total	
Long-Term	
Debt	
59	 61	 69	 60	 79	 76	 33	 75	 58	 40	 21	 33	
Bond	With	
Maturity	of	
less	than	2	
Years		to	Total	
Bonds	
5	 24	 6.7	 23.8	 32.2	 30	 12	 14	 23	 21.3	 32.2	 5	
Investment	
Grade	to	Total	
Bond	
88	 28	 87	 88	 90	 96	 84	 94	 86	 89	 82	
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Fixed	Asset	to	
Equity	Ratio	
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Interest	
Coverage	
Ratio
9
	
4.2	 20	 3.9	 4.6	 5.1	 8.8	 2.1	 9.6	 7.6	 5.3	 3.7	 9.9	
C
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st
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f	
D
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Synthetic	
Rating	
A2/A	
Aaa/AA
A	
A3/A
-	
A2/A	
Aa2/
AA	
Aaa/AA
A	
Ba2/
BB	
Aaa/AA
A	
Aa2/AA	 A2/A	 A3/A-	
Aaa/AA
A	
Spread	 0.99%	 0.54%	
1.13
%	
0.99%	
0.72
%	
0.54%	
2.38
%	
0.54%	 0.72%	
0.99
%	
1.13
%	
0.54%	
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Equity	
Reinvestment	
Ratio	
9.4	 11.1	 -4.5	 13	 10	 12	 -2.8	 15.9	 -3.2	 9.2	 3.5	 10	
A
ss
e
t	
Q
u
a
li
ty
	
Profitability	 15	 7	 2.4	 5.9	 7.8	 7.8	 3.7	 10	 9.3	 7.6	 3.9	 4.4	
Quick	Ratio	
	
0.83	 1.7**	 1.1	 1.3	 1.5	 1.3	 1.8**	 0.4	 1	 0.6	 0.3	 1	
                                                            
9 The interest coverage ratio is median of the industry. 
Tangible	Asset	
Ratio	
42	 10	 60	 28	 19	 23	 68	 36	 6	 68	 15	 20	
Note:	*	For	large	non-financial	service	companies	with	market	cap	>	$	5	billion.	This	is	a	table	that	relates	the	interest	coverage	ratio	of	a	firm	to	a	"synthetic"	rating	
and	a	default	spread	that	goes	with	that	rating.	The	link	between	interest	coverage	ratios	and	ratings	was	developed	by	looking	at	all	rated	companies	in	the	United	
States.	The	default	spreads	are	obtained	from	traded	bonds.	Adding	that	number	to	a	risk-free	rate	should	yield	the	pre-tax	cost	of	borrowing	for	a	firm.	Based	on	the	
table	provided	by	NYU	stern	http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ratings.htm	
** Due	to	lack	of	data	availability	for	construction	and	real	estate,	although	it	is	reported	here,	the	quick	ratio	is	built	based	on	the	data	from	only	a	few	firms	in	
these	industries.	
(Stronger Tail of the corporate sector to the weaker tail of the corporate sector) 
Indebtedness range guide: 
 
Range	 	 	 	 	 	
Debt	Ratio	(Net	Debt	to	Total	Capital)	
Min	 50	 45	 	
27	
15	
Max	 58	 49	 44	
	
26	
Debt	Accumulation-	Change	in	net	debt	(%;	2007q4-2017q4)	
Min	 176	 165	 	
30	
20	
Max	 200	 175	 164	
	
29	
	
Leverage range guide: 
 
Leverage	range	 	 	 	 	
Debt-to-equity	
Min	 1.4	 1	 	
0.6	
0.1	
Max	 1.6	 1.3	 0.9	
	
0.5	
Debt-to-income	
Min	 4.6	 2.6	 	
2.1	
1	
Max	 7	 4.5	 2.5	
	
2	
 
 
Debt Structure Guide: 
 
Range	 		 	 	 		
Outstanding	bonds	with	less		than	the	2-year	maturity	date	
Min	 31	 27	 	
6.6	
1	
Max	 35	 30	 26	
	
6.5	
Long-term	debt	to	Total	Debt	
Min	 80	 85	 90	
	
96	
Max	 84	 89	 	
95	
100	
Investment	grade	as	a	share	of	total	outstanding	bonds	
Min	 1	 20	 30	
	
93	
Max	 19	 29	 	
92	
97	
Outstanding	Bond	(Fixed	Rate)	to	Total	Long-Term	Debt		
Min	 1	 23	 40	
	
76	
Max	 22	 39	 	
75	
95	
 
 
Debt Repayment Capacity Guide: 
	
	 	 	 	 	
Interest	Coverage	Ratio	
Min	 1	 3	 4.1	
	
15	
Max	 2.9	 4	 	
14.9	
65	
Debt	service	Ratio	
Min	 0.5	 0.3	 0.2	
	
0.1	
 
Capital Structure Guide: 
 
Range	 	 	 	 	 	
Equity	Reinvestment	Ratio	
Min	 -5	 0	 0.1	
	
14.1	
Max	 -3	 -2.9	 	
14	
17	
Capital	Ratio	(Fixed	Asset	to	Shareholders’	equity)	
Min	 3.2	 2.7	 	
1	
0.1	
Max	 3.5	 3.1	 2.6	
	
0.9	
 
Solvency Guide: 
 
Range	 	 	 	 	
Profitability	
Min	 1	 3	 4	
	
10	
Max	 2.9	 3.9	 9	
	
16	
Quick	Ratio		
Min	 0	 0.4	 	
0.8	
1.4	
Max	 0.5	 0.7	 	
1.3	
1.6	
Tangible	Asset	Ratio	
Min	 5	 10	 22	
	
65	
Max	 9	 21	 64	 70	
 
The heat map in Table 1 groups sectors in three channels of financial fragility: leverage and 
indebtedness issue, debt servicing or a combination of both. Extrapolating from these 
sustainability ratios, we surveyed sectors along the following dimensions: 
  
 
• Debt Accumulation: We turn in this section to examine the development of debt 
vulnerabilities. Since 2007, the total debt level of the nonfinancial corporates continued 
to increase by at least 140 percentage points for the firms in our sample (Figure 3, panel 
a). Among the sectors, firms in industries such as information and retail have 
accumulated debt with the fastest pace (Table 1).
10
 
 
                                                            
10 To identify sectors in this analysis, as vulnerable or viable, we rely on their respective quantile in the 
factor’s distribution. We have three major categories that describe the performance of each sector 
regarding an indicator: vulnerable, moderate and strong. The categories are based on the percentile of the 
distributions (>=75th is considered as vulnerable, 55th-74th percentile indicates moderate risks, and 
<15th percentile is considered strong). 
• Debt Level (leverage or debt ratio): Yet, the most indebted sectors are real estate and 
accommodation in which debt has risen markedly, from already elevated levels to almost 
50 percent of their total assets (Figure 3, panel b). Most of this increase in corporate debt 
is accounted for by the rise in long-term debt. Short-term and long-term debt increased by 
60 and 150 percentage points respectively.
11
 This reliance on long-term borrowing is 
consistent for every sector in our sample. As of December 2017, long-term debt 
constitutes at least 80 percent of nonfinancial total corporate debt in all sectors (Table 
2).
12
  
 
• Debt Overhang: The negative consequences of excessive leverage for economic growth 
and financial stability are well documented in the literature of private debt.
13
 So far, the 
default rates for firms in different sectors are low, and the favorable impact of economic 
growth outweighed the adverse effects of interest obligations (thanks partly to the near-
zero interest rate).
14
 In the meantime, these standardized measures indicate that the real 
estate and utilities debt sustainability is in the vulnerable territory while accommodation 
and transportation sectors are following them. High leverage makes corporates in 
different sectors exposed to higher borrowing costs and negative shocks to earnings in the 
future. This could underscore the need for private sector deleveraging in some sectors.
15
 
The concern is that the current low growth macroeconomic environment if persists could 
make the adjustment very difficult. This would set the stage for a feedback loop in which 
lower growth impedes deleveraging, and the debt overhang worsens the economic 
slowdown.
16
 
 
                                                            
11 To estimate the portion of debt exposed to changes in interest rates, this paper uses data from 
corporates regulatory filings on the total amount of outstanding debt, its breakdown into fixed and 
variable-rate, and its maturity structure. 
12 We group debt instruments into two categories based on their maturity:  long-term and short-term 
debts. Short-term debt, maturing in less than one year, includes short-term loans and commercial papers. 
Long-term debts include bonds and long-term loans. This is based on BIS classification of financial 
instruments: http://www.tffs.org/pdf/edsg/edsgcha3.pdf. 
13 Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke et 
al (1999)). 
14 IMF Financial Stability Report (2017). 
15 IMF (2016). 
16 Buttiglione and others 2014; McKinsey Global Institute 2015; Gaspar, Obstfeld, and Sahay 2016. 
We find that firms in the utilities, real estate, and utilities are especially vulnerable under these 
circumstances (figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: corporate debt for nonfinancial firms in our sample (1000 U.S. firms with the largest 
market capitalization) 
 
Debt ratio (1000 largest NFCs; percentage) 
 
 
 
 
The rising leverage discussed above has been reflected in an increased debt burden in many 
sectors as captured by an interest coverage ratio. The interest coverage ratio (ICR) delivers a 
more comprehensive measurement of the ability to service debt payments with earnings.
17
 A 
highly levered sector could conveniently service its debt if it has high profitability or low-interest 
expenses. On the contrary, a firm with moderate leverage could face financial problems if it 
generates low earnings from its activities, or if it pays high-interest. Although there is no 
consensus about how much is too low, the IMF used an ICR threshold of 2 to classify at-risk 
borrowers.
18
 Using the IMF threshold for the ICR, real estate is the only sector in our sample that 
is in the vulnerable territory to service its debt.
19
 Real estate sector’s low-interest coverage ratio, 
coupled with its high leverage, make this sector amongst the most fragile sectors in this study. 
                                                            
17 The historical values of the interest rate coverage ratio for the 2000–2016 period are obtained by 
aggregating EBIT and interest expense at the industry level on an annual basis. Firm-level observations in 
which either EBIT or interest expense are missing are discarded for consistency. 
18 Global Financial Stability Report, April (2014). 
19 It is important to note that in our analysis, the cut off for vulnerable, moderate and strong sectors are 
based on the cut offs for their historical distribution. The firms that are in >= 95 percentile, Notable: 75th- 
94h percentile are considered as vulnerable, 55th-74th percentile have moderate risks, and lower than 17 
percentile are strong. The aim is to compare each sector’s performance relative to other sectors in the 
economy. 
0
20
40
60
80
2007q4 2009q4 2011q4 2013q4 2015q4 2017q4
S
h
a
re
	o
f	
a
ss
e
ts
	(
%
)
Accommodation	
Real	Estate	
all	sectors	excl.	utilities,		accomodation	and	real	estate
Utilities	
 Also, although the energy sector does not have high leverage, its interest coverage ratio and 
earning patterns indicate some vulnerabilities that are not captured by the leverage ratio alone.  
Figure 4.b plots the historical path of the interest rate coverage ratios following the crisis for the 
levered sectors and the energy sector. We included the energy sector as its debt has raised by 
more than 100 percentage points after the crisis while its debt servicing capacity decreased 
sharply from 2014 although it has recovered recently. This low-interest coverage ratio for firms 
in the energy sector is accompanied by a considerable reduction in earnings since 2014 (Figure 4, 
panel b and c).  This implies that change in the interest rate coverage ratio in recent years is 
partly caused by the weak and volatile earnings of the sector. In contrast, the earnings for other 
sectors with low ICR, and also the ones with moderate ICR, has remained fairly stable since the 
financial crisis (Figure 4, panel c and d).  
 
 
 
Figure 4: Interest coverage ratio, leverage and earning dynamics 
Panel a: Debt to Equity Ratio (Vulnerable Sectors) 
 
Panel b: interest coverage ratio (EBIT/Interest Expenses) for highly leveraged sectors 
 
Panel c: Earning (as the ratio of assets) for sectors with low ICR 
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To sum up, developments in corporate leverage and debt servicing capacity have attracted 
considerable attention by regulators, particularly in light of the financial market’s dramatic 
restructuring in the aftermath of the introduction of the Dodd-Frank Act. Figure 5 compares the 
levels of leverage (measured as debt to equity) and debt repayment ability (measured by interest 
coverage ratio) the sectors in our sample. The data suggest that the high leverage ratios of firms 
in real estate, and utilities relative to other industries have made them more exposed to an 
increase in borrowing costs. In the literature, there is no universal agreement on the implications 
of leverage on financial positions of corporates.
20
 However, there are fears that the sheer size of 
corporate leverage- if accompanied with impaired ability to service the debt- could set the stage 
for an unprecedented deleveraging process. 
 
 
Figure 5: Interest coverage ratio and Leverage, 2017: Q4 
                                                            
20 In the literature, there is no universal agreement on the implications of leverage on financial positions 
of corporates. Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1999), Cantillo and 
Wright (2000) and Denis and Mihov (2003) interpret high leverage as a reputational factor; highlighting 
the ability of the corporate borrowers to attract external lenders successfully. Esho et al. (2001), however, 
argues that higher leverage signals financial distress and there is a negative relationship between the 
issuance of debt and corporates’ financial position. 
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Understanding Macro-Financial Linkages and Debt Sustainability: Corporate Balance Sheet 
Weaknesses and Strengths Matter 
 
The interaction between the financial position of corporates and macroeconomic fluctuations is 
an important channel through which a financial crisis transmits into the real economy.
21
 Thus, if 
the corporate sector enters a financial crisis with high leverage, it will intensify both the depth 
and duration of the subsequent recession.
22
 However, understanding the sustainability of 
corporate leverage is complex as there are many kinds of debt, asset, and capital structure. A 
corporate-specific balance sheet approach provides a useful analytical framework for exploring 
how balance sheet dynamics contribute to macro-financial vulnerabilities. In the case of 
nonfinancial corporates, a sector’s ability to repay its debt in times of financial depends on 
mismatches on several dimensions:  
 
                                                            
21 Claessens and Kose (2018). 
22 Claessens and Kose (2018). 
Accommodation
Construction
Energy
Health
Information
Manufacturing
Real	Estate
Retail
Technical	and	
Professional	Services
Transportation
Utilities
Wholeslae	Trade
-1.2 
-1 
-0.8 
-0.6 
-0.4 
-0.2 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
-0.8 -0.6 -0.4 -0.2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
D
E
B
T
	S
E
R
V
IC
IN
G
	C
A
P
A
C
IT
Y
	(
V
E
R
T
IC
A
L)
LEVERAGE	(HORIZONTAL)
Debt	Servicing	and	Leverage
Debt structure, which encompasses different features such as interest rate, liquidity (investment 
grade versus high yield) and maturity mismatches of different debt instruments.
23
 For instance, a 
high level of short-term debt can make external investors reassess their willingness to lend to a 
corporate sector. This could lead to a sector unable to service its debt commitments if creditors 
decline to roll over debt. It also makes the sector more vulnerable to rise in the interest rates.    
Capital structure, which highlights the differences in the use of debt and equity financing. 
Traditionally, a heavy reliance on debt rather than equity financing could expose the sectors to 
the risks from revenue shocks. 
And solvency mismatches are where assets, including the present value of revenue streams, are 
insufficient to cover liabilities.  
 
By examining balance sheet stresses along these dimensions, this paper supplements the 
measures are taken above to examine the systemic risk that sectors’ financing profiles might 
carry. 
 
Debt structure: Interest rate, maturity, and liquidity structure 
 
Overall, changes in the composition of debt instruments in recent years has reduced the risks of 
facing debt service problems in our sample. In particular, two outstanding trends occurred after 
the crisis. First, corporates significantly shifted their financing towards corporate bond issuance – 
instruments with mostly fixed coupon- from banks loan- which mostly have floating rates. 
Second, the share of long-term debt has increased.  Higher borrowing at longer maturities 
lowered refinancing risk - the risk of not being able to replace maturing debt- and the plunge in 
the share of variable interest rate debt reduces duration and interest rate exposure –the risk that 
the average interest rate on outstanding debt increases. Yet, this aggregate analysis masks some 
of the risks isolated in some sectors. Corporates in utilities, real estate, transportation, and 
wholesale trade sectors have the most risk structure due to their reliance on loans with variable 
rates. Information and manufacturing sectors are also vulnerable because of their share of 
maturing debts in the next two years. The construction sector follows them due to its reliance on 
high yield bonds. 
                                                            
23 Maturity mismatch refers to a gap between liabilities due in the short term and the long term. 
 Results of our survey are presented below in Table 3:  
 
 
 
 
Table 3 Amount Outstanding of Nonfinancial Corporate Bonds As of March 2018 
 
Sectors	
Investment	
Grade		 Fixed	Rate		
	
																				Maturity	Structure			
	
(2028+)	
	
	(2023-
2027)	
	 (2020-2023)	 	(2018-2019)	
Accommodation	 88.9%	 100.0%	 18.6%	 67.3%	 9.1%	
																			
5%	
Construction	 29.6%	 100.0%	 17.5%	 21.8%	 36.7%	 24%	
Energy	 89.9%	 96.8%	 53%	 21.4%	 18.9%	 6.7%	
Health	 88.2%	 99.9%	 39.0%	 22.7%	 14.5%	 23.8%	
Information	 92.3%	 88.9%	 33.7%	 20.0%	 10.6%	 35.7%	
Manufacturing	 96.9%	 95.1%	 32.0%	 22.2%	 15.8%	 30%	
Real	Estate	 84.5%	 99.4%	 29.2%	 44.2%	 13.6%	 13%	
Retail	Trade	 96.4%	 99.2%	 38.8%	 23.1%	 23.8%	 14.3%	
Technical	and	
Professional	 86.8%	 95.3%	 16.0%	 46.9%	 14.6%	 22.5%	
Transportation	 87.9%	 94.2%	 45.9%	 25.1%	 7.7%	 21.3%	
Utilities		 83.4%	 98.8%	 31.4%	 25.5%	 11.3%	 31.8%	
Wholesale	
Trade	 18.2%	 99.8%	 6.2%	 6.5%	 83.3%	 4%	
All	Sectors	 78.6%	 97.3%	 31.5%	 24.1%	 18.9%	 25.4%	
 
 
 
This shift in the composition of corporate happened at the start of the 2008 financial crisis, 
characterized by the low cost of debt financing and central banks’ quantitative easing. As of 
2018, corporate bond made up at least 60 percentage points of all outstanding long-term debt 
raised by most sectors in our sample (Table 3). Yet, increased dependence on bond issuance 
made corporates more vulnerable to creditors’ willingness to allow borrowers to roll over their 
debt during the period of the credit crunch.  As Chui et al. (2014) noticed, “If investors were to 
suffer a significant loss of appetite, issuing firms might face difficulty in rolling over their 
outstanding debts, particularly if shifts in risk appetite coincide with a fall-off in projected 
earnings.” 
 The state of borrowers’ balance sheet affects firms’ access to the capital market and external 
financing.
24
 A few empirical studies are examined why some corporates choose to borrow from 
public debt markets- such as bonds- while other firms rely on loans.
25
 The typical risk from an 
excessive level of any debt- be private and public - is the exposure to fluctuations in short-term 
interest rates. After the crisis, corporates shifted the composition of their debt towards bond 
financing. However, this shift from loan financing to bond financing implies that most of the 
potential exposures would be due to rolling over maturing debts, rather than from changes in 
short-term rates, as about 98  percentage points of outstanding corporate bonds have a fixed 
coupon (Table 3).
2627
 The observed shift in the composition of corporate debt and the evolution 
of the reliance on corporate bonds relative to bank loans implies that these firms probably may 
not experience difficulties in the face of increasing rates. 
 
This aggregate analysis comes with caveats. First, the share and amount of outstanding bonds to 
loans and fixed- to floating-rate debt are assumed not to be affected by the changes in the federal 
funds rate.
28
 Second, it provides no insights on sectoral differences.  There is considerable 
heterogeneity among sectors, as not all sectors are in the same position to issue debt, nor do they 
face the same risks or cash flows. We find that firms in the utilities, wholesale trade, and real 
estate and to some extent transportation sectors seem to be vulnerable to changes in interest rates 
as loans constitute a significant part of their debt (Table 3). Bank loan constitutes around 80 
percent, 70 percent and 60 percent of their total long-term debt respectively. About 85 percent of 
loans issued by these corporations have floating rates.
29
 This implies that their interest expenses 
would rise in tandem with changes in short-term interest rates. The modest vulnerability found in 
the aggregate level masked essential exposures isolated in some industries. 
 
                                                            
24 Claessens and Kose (2018). 
25 This is in contrast with the extensive literature on corporates capital structure (See for instance Tirole 
(2006)). 
26 Here the assumption is that assuming corporates maintain the same debt composition. 
27 Based on authors estimations and data from Thomson Reuters.  
28 This is a well-documented assumption in the assessment of potential increase in corporate debt interest 
rates from changes in short term rates. See for instance Correa et al. (2017), among others. 
29 Based on authors estimations and data from Thomson Reuters. 
As mentioned earlier, most of the potential exposures would be due to rolling over maturing 
debts, rather than from changes in short-term rates. Against this backdrop, a key priority for 
identifying the interest rate exposure is to assess factors such as maturity and liquidity 
(investment grade versus high yield) structure of the outstanding debt. Once taking different 
maturity into accounts, not all sectors with substantial reliance on bond financing are equally 
vulnerable to roll-over their debt. Such potential vulnerabilities appear to be relevant for firms in 
the information and manufacturing sectors. These sectors are more exposed to changes in interest 
rates in the next two years as more than 30 percent of all outstanding bonds, investment grade, 
and high yield, held by these sectors mature in less than two years.
3031
 In contrast, sectors such as 
accommodation, energy, and wholesale trade have less than 10 percent of their bonds maturing 
in the next two years. This implies that, in aggregate, only a moderate portion of the outstanding 
corporate bonds for these sectors would be directly exposed to the increase in interest expenses 
in the next two years. This sectoral heterogeneity has important consequences for the supply of 
external financing to these sectors and hence the real economy.
32
 
 
The liquidity of the bonds- investment grade vis-a-vis high yield- affects the exposure of the 
creditors to the changes in macroeconomic condition. We examine the liquidity risks of sectors 
by measuring the size of the high-yield bond and investment grade bond against the amounts of 
total debt outstanding.
33
 The holders of high-yield bonds are more exposed to a rise in interest 
rates as any such increase affects the capacity of the issuers of high-yield to repay their interest 
burden more than investment grade.
34
  
 
The market share of high-yield bonds in the overall corporate bond market in the U.S. is 
considerably smaller than the investment grade bond market. Nearly 80 percent of bonds in most 
sectors are liquid, investment grade bonds. However, illiquid, high yield bonds constitute around 
                                                            
30 The data is as of March, 2018. 
31 More than 30 percent of the corporate bonds in utilities sector also will mature in less than two years. 
However, corporate bond in total only constitutes 10 percent of firms’ long-term debt in this sector. 
32 De Fiore and Uhlig (2015). 
33 The  diffusion  of  debt securities,  and therefore  also  high-yield  bonds,  can  be  measured  in  a few 
ways, including the amounts outstanding, gross or net issuance, the number of issuers, and the number of 
banks or other investors taking part in the public debt market. 
34 The investment grade bonds in general have lower coupons than high yields. They are also more liquid 
and more easily tradable in the market. 
70 and 80 percent of the corporate bonds issued by construction and wholesale trade sectors 
respectively. The heavy reliance on the issuance of below-investment-grade rated, illiquid 
securities in these sectors implies that creditors that are holding the debt issued by construction 
and wholesale trade sectors are more exposed to the changes in financial conditions of these 
sectors. Creditors’ exposures to corporate leverage have significant consequences for the whole 
financial system as debt repayment by the borrowers is vital for the survival of the creditors- 
mostly banks and other financial market participants.
35
 
 
Taking all different characteristics of debt composition- fixed versus floating rate, maturity, and 
quality of issued debt- into account, the data suggest that overall, firms in utilities, real estate, 
transportation and wholesale trade sectors- for their reliance on loans with floating rates- and 
information and manufacturing sectors- for their share of maturing debts in the next two years- 
are the most exposed sectors to changes in interest rate while construction and wholesale sector- 
for their reliance on high yield bonds- follow them. The sharp reliance on bond financing of 
construction sector following the crisis, as well as its high share of below-investment-grade rated 
bonds, makes construction sector of particular interest. However, the existence of this avenue of 
corporate finance funding is particularly common for sectors - such as construction - with a large 
number of small and medium-sized firms that are not able to lend from banks or borrow on 
flexible condition.
36
  
 
 
Capital Structure: external and internal financing 
 
The evolution of a firm’s capital structure provides some insights into assessing corporate debt 
vulnerability. Thus far, there is no widespread agreement on how capital structure affects 
leverage.
37
 When corporations adopt a financing strategy based on the use of debt finance, they 
are reallocating some expected future earnings away from equity holders in return for cash up 
                                                            
35 De Bondt and Ibáñez (2005). 
36 De Bondt and Ibáñez (2005). 
37 One of the most popular views suggest that issuing debt, instead of equity, to finance new investment 
projects would communicate the information to the market about the quality of the new projects. This 
new information increases the quality of the new debt and effectively reduces relative costs of issuing new 
debts. This reduction in the asymmetric information about the new investments has important 
implications for capital structure and firms’ leverage. For more details, see Grenadier and Malenko (2011).  
front.
38
 The factors that drive this choice remain obscure regardless of a vast literature and 
decades of empirical studies. External financing – a choice between debt and equity- and internal 
financing- use of firms’ resources such as retained earnings- are essential components of the 
capital structure. In this study, at least three sectors- real estate, utilities, and accommodation- are 
identified as extensively relying on debt financing compared to the economy as a whole. Firms in 
real estate and energy sectors seem to also have a very low appetite to reinvest for their future 
growth– a measure of using internal funding. 
 
Corporates’ decision to become levered engages in a tradeoff between the costs and benefits of 
debt financing relative to other options such as internal financing. In this study, the use of 
internal financing strategies – such as growth option- is captured by the equity reinvestment 
ratio.
39
 The equity reinvestment ratio measures the proportion of earnings reinvested for future 
growth instead of paying the shareholders. The sectors with higher ratio – retail, manufacturing, 
and health- are projected to have more stable growth and return on equity in the future (Table 3). 
According to classic capital structure theories, corporates become less risky and reduces the 
expected bankruptcy costs if they exercise the growth (reinvestment) option.
40
 This would lead to 
the reduction in the costs of debt issuance and as a result the corporate’s leverage ratio would 
also decline in the future. In addition, from the perspective of managers, retained earnings are a 
better source of financing that external financing unless it is a low-quality firm.
41
  
 
In contrast, firms in the real estate, energy, and technical and professional sectors have negative 
reinvestment ratio. As companies grow and mature, they tend to shrink their net new investment 
in operating capital. Yet, a negative rate still could imply that these industries have downsized 
the size of their working asset over time. This is particularly problematic if negative 
reinvestment ratio coupled with a high level of indebtedness as is the case for real estate and 
technical and professional sectors. As Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers (1977) argue, 
corporate managers have incentives to underinvest in future growth opportunities when corporate 
                                                            
38 Goyal and Frank (2009) 
39 Equity reinvestment ratio is calculated as ((Capital Expenditures - Depreciation) - Change in non-cash 
Working Capital - (Principal repaid - New Debt Issued))/ Net Income. It can be greater than 100% (for 
corporates that are issuing new stocks and investing it back into the business) and negative. 
40 See Trade-off model of capital structure.   
41 See Pecking Order Theory. 
treasures know that firms hold risky debt outstanding. In this scenario, managers act to maximize 
present equity value rather than investing in future growth. The decrease in the size of industry 
assets attributable to these sub-optimal investment decisions is an important component of the 
agency cost of debt.
42
 This has critical negative implications for the future repayment capacity of 
the firms in real estate and energy sectors. 
 
To understand the extent of external finance, a fixed asset to shareholders’ equity ratio is 
employed.
43
 This ratio is used to capture the relative exposure of debt holders and shareholders 
to the performance and profitability of the corporates. In general, for most sectors, this ratio is 
above one.
44
 This implies that stockholders’ equity is lower than the corporates’ fixed assets and 
firms in these sectors rely on debt to finance their activities (See Table 3, appendix). Yet, 
compared to other industries, firms in real estate, utilities, and accommodation industries are 
more reliant on debt issuance to finance their assets.
45
 This is not surprising as these sectors are 
among the most indebted sectors under the standardized metrics.   
 
There is no unified model of leverage currently available that can assess the ultimate effect of 
capital structure on debt. Many models of capital structure have been put forward. Still, the 
literature has not come up with a concrete empirical basis to differentiate the strengths and 
weaknesses of the main theories. Yet, only a number of theories have a lot of supporters. 
Notably, most corporate finance textbooks mention the "trade-off theory" in which tax policy 
and bankruptcy costs are fundamental determinants of capital structure. Myers (1984) suggested 
the "pecking order theory."  In this theory, there is a financing hierarchy of retained earnings, 
debt, and then equity. More recently, the idea that firms involved in "market timing," or choosing 
                                                            
42 Billett, King, and Mauer (2007). 
43 A company’s fixed assets are the long-term, tangible, component that is used to generate income; the 
return on fixed asset is a firms’ profitability. 
44 The ratio of fixed asset to shareholder’s equity measures the contribution of stockholders and the 
contribution of debt issuance in the fixed assets of the corporate. The inverse of this ratio shows the 
proportion of assets that is funded by debt. If the ratio is more than 1, it means that stockholders’ equity is 
less than the fixed assets and the firm is relying on debt financing as a portion of fixed assets. If the ratio 
is less than 1, it means that stockholders’ equity is more than the fixed assets and the equity financing is 
used not only for the fixed assets but also a part of the working capital. 
45“There is an implicit assumption that the number of shares outstanding has remained unchanged. This 
is because the ratio measures the total amount of equity. The total amount of equity can be increased by 
issuing shares at lower prices to the public or to the promoters. However, this may not be a desirable 
scenario since more shares means a loss to individual shareholders.” 
to finance their debts externally based on perceived market conditions, has become widespread. 
Finally, agency costs, which arise when there is a conflict of interest between the needs of the 
principal and that of the agent, lurk in the background of much of the debate in the literature.  
These theories often work better with the trade-off model; when broadly interpreted.
46
 
 
The cost of financial distress generated by excessive debt levels depends on firms’ asset 
structure- the types of assets that a firm has.
47
 The two major risks corresponding to firms’ asset 
composition are low return and illiquidity. In this paper, the return on asset is captured by 
profitability- a measure of income dynamics- while the quick ratio and asset tangibility ratio are 
used to capture the scale of asset liquidity. Further, debt is high even when assets are accounted 
for- an indication of possible pressure to deleverage.  Profitable and liquid assets can reduce the 
risks of a disorderly adjustment during the deleveraging process. The data suggest that firms in 
utilities sectors are the most exposed to asset risk as they have less liquid and low profitable asset 
structure. Real estate and energy sectors also show signs of vulnerabilities as they are among the 
least profitable sectors despite possessing a high share of tangible assets. The nature or quality of 
assets held by firms could either strengthen or weaken corporates’ resilience against external 
shocks to service their debt.
48
  
 
Asset structure, such as its liquidity and profitability, is a major determinant of the leverage ratio 
and the ability to repay.
49
 Measures of asset liquidity that are used in this paper are quick ratio 
and asset tangibility ratio. The quick ratio measures short-term solvency - the ability of the firm 
to meet its debt requirements as they come due. Utilities, transportation, and retail have the 
lowest quick ratio. Low quick ratios often indicate the weak position in holding liquid assets.  
Yet, a too high quick ratio may indicate that the firms’ treasurer is holding too much cash in 
reserves.
50
 In this analysis, the sectors with the highest quick ratio, namely information, 
                                                            
46 Goyal and Frank (2009). 
47 If a firm retains large investments in tangible assets, it will have smaller costs of financial distress than 
firms that rely on intangible assets (Daskalakis and Psillaki, 2009). 
48 Chui, Fender and Sushko (2014). 
49 For instance, Berg and Gider (2016) find that one single factor- asset risk- is able to explain up to 90% 
of the difference in leverage ratios between banks and non-banks over the 1965-2013 period. They also 
run the same experiments for the non-financial corporates in different sectors. 
50 It may also mean that the company has a high accounts receivables, indicating that the company may be 
having problems collecting on its account receivables. 
manufacturing, and health also hold the highest cash as a share of their total assets (Table 3 and 
Figure 6). Amongst these sectors, information and health also have the highest growth in their 
cash holding in the period following the crisis (Figure 6, panel b). This is important as corporate 
cash holding is one indicator that some corporate treasures may have tempted into more 
speculative activities, rather than raising business investment, due to low volatilities.
51
 
Nevertheless, the overall scale of increase in cash holding is difficult to judge. Even normal 
operations by the treasurers could significantly lead to a substantial rise in deposits at banks (e.g., 
as a result of time-to-build and similar constraints). To better understand the ability to repay, it is 
essential to consider asset characteristics such as liquidity. 
 
Tangible assets are equally valuable in understanding the risks associated with corporate 
leverage. In particular, they are essential to assess debt service capacity as these assets are easier 
to collateralize and suffer a smaller loss of value when firms go into distress.
52
  Our results in 
most cases confirm a well-documented prediction by trade-off theory that tangible assets are 
positively related to corporate leverage.
53
 Consistent with this literature, sectors such as the 
technical and professional industries that have low leverage are also the sector with the lowest 
share of tangible assets.
54
 The only exception is utilities- this sector has high leverage and low 
tangible asset ratio. These theories suggest that corporates with more tangible assets have higher 
optimal leverage ratio as tangible assets can be reused as collateral, which mitigates both 
financial distress costs and agency costs of debt (e.g., Stulz and Johnson, 1985). Further, as firms 
tend to match the maturity of assets with a maturity of liabilities, tangibility would be positively 
related to leverage (Koksal et al., 2013). 
 
                                                            
51 Chui, Fender and Sushko (2014). 
52 However, using tangible asset ratio has its accounting limitations. There are inconsistent accounting for 
investment made in intangible assets. For instance, accountants seems to take the distinction between 
capital expense and operating expense into account when accounting for tangible assets for 
manufacturing. They generally put investment in plant, equipment and buildings in the capital expense 
and allocate labor and raw material as operating expense. Any expense that generates benefits over 
several years is considered as a capital expense while expenses that creates benefits only in a specific 
current year are operating expenses. However, most of the capital investments by firms in information 
and health sector are in R&D that accountants account as operating expenses rather than capital 
expenses.  
53 Titman and Wessels (1988). 
54 In contrast, firms in construction, information and technical and professional services sectors that have 
low tangible asset ratios in our sample have low debt ratio. 
Profitability- an indicator of return on asset- is an essential determinant of firms’ leverage as is 
reflected in debt to income ratio.
55
 Profitability is calculated as the ratio of earnings to a firm’s 
total assets. Not surprisingly, the sectors with the lowest profitability- utilities, energy, and real 
estate- are amongst the most levered sectors too. Still, there are vulnerabilities that are isolated in 
firms in the utilities sector that are not reflected in standard ratios. This sector seems to have the 
riskiest asset structure- compared to other levered sectors- as it has both poor liquidity and 
profitability measures. This vulnerability could undermine utilities’ sector ability to refinance its 
debt- even compared to other leveraged sectors- and put further pressure on its debt repayment 
capacity. Prior empirical studies document the relationship between debt financing and firms’ 
asset structure.
56
 Their findings confirm that from a lender’s perspective, a corporates’ ability to 
service its debt is positively related to its ability to generate profit and owning assets that can be 
used as collateral during financial distress. A poor asset structure changes creditors’ willingness 
to renew their lending or lend new funds, to those firms. 
 
There is no consensus on the threshold at which debt levels start to trigger deleveraging. Yet, an 
extensive literature has established that highly indebted borrowers will sooner or later decrease 
their leverage as they are unable to service their debt and can no longer borrow.
57
 Profitable and 
liquid assets can reduce the risks of a disorderly adjustment and help corporates to conduct a 
smooth deleveraging process.
58
  Our study finds that firms in utilities, real estate, and energy are 
the least profitable sectors. In addition, firms in the utilities sector seem to have riskiest asset 
structure, compared to other sectors, by having low tangible asset ratio as well as low 
profitability. This implies that firms in the utilities sector probably face higher risks of a 
disorderly adjustment during the deleveraging process. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
55 Debt to income ratio is a popular measure of leverage. 
56 Houston and James (1996), Johnson (1997), Krishnaswami et al. (1998), Cantillo and Wright (2000) 
and Denis and Mihov (2003). 
57 Researches have studied the impact on growth not only for private, but also for public, debt (see, for 
example, Krugman 1988; Sachs 1989; Cecchetti, Mohanty, and Zampolli 2011; Baum, Checherita- 
Westphal, and Rother 2013; and Reinhart and Rogoff 2010). 
58 Rajan and Zingales (1995). 
  
Figure 6: corporate cash holding 
Panel 1: accounts receivable and cash and short-term investments (as a percentage of the asset) 
 
 
Panel 2: Change in cash holding (%; 2007q4-2017q4) 
 
 
 
 
Some Sector Specific Features  
 
Given the prevailing role that housing played as a catalyst to the crisis, it is important to better 
understand the determinants of the debt dynamics and leverage in the recent cycle. In this study, 
real estate is amongst the most leveraged sectors as is reflected in its volatile debt repayment 
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capacity. The supplementary indicators reveal additional vulnerabilities in the composition of 
debts it holds, its choice of capital structure and quality of its assets. Most of the sector’s debt is 
composed of loans with floating rates. Further, it has negative equity reinvestment ratio- an 
indicator that shows the firms in this sector are not reinvesting for their future growth. The return 
on its assets – captured by profitability – is amongst the poorest.  
 
Some sector-specific characteristics help explain these observations. For example, real estate 
investments, by their nature, have low liquidity and high tangibility. Real estate is tangible, and 
the firms can have a certain degree of physical control over their assets. Therefore, the assets can 
be used as collateral during financial distress. In contrast, except for real estate securities, there is 
no public exchange for trading the real estate. This makes real estate sector investments less 
liquid by nature.   
 
Further, the real estate industry is on an accelerating disruption curve in recent years highlighted 
by rapid shifts in tenant dynamics, customer demographic and technological changes. These 
developments deteriorated the performance of the industry as business productivity has not 
caught up with these technological improvements and tenant dynamics yet.
59
 These ecosystem 
developments have adversely impacted the financial position of firms in this industry in recent 
years.
60
  This is because income return from real estate is directly associated with the capacity to 
rent the properties as well as the ability of firms to reduce the operating costs.
61
 Firms’ ability to 
generate a higher return, therefore, depends on its ability to meet demand. In weaker markets 
characterized by an oversupply of vacancies or low demand- firms will struggle to raise their 
profitability. 
 
Further, our data suggests, investment in the industry has been decreased in recent years despite 
some improvements in the industry’s fundamentals such as positive rent growth and net 
absorption and stable vacancy rates across different types.
62
 At least three factors could 
contribute to this phenomenon: first, the market could be discounting these improvements in the 
                                                            
59 Josh Bersin, Bill Pelster, Jeff Schwartz, Bernard van der Vyve (2017). 
60 Deloite real estate sector outlook (2018). 
61 Real estate return comprises of two elements: returns from capital appreciation and income return. 
62 Q2 2017 Office and Industrial Market Beat, Cushman & Wakefield; US Retail Outlook Q2 2016 and Q2 
2017, JLL. 
industry’s fundamentals for the broader macroeconomic trends, such as rising interest rates, 
tightening lending standards, and perceived heated property valuations. Second, reinvestment in 
the sector is likely being impacted by the influence of market trends that are affecting tenants. 
And third, the rise in investor activism perhaps created a delay in making important investment 
decisions. To put this in perspective, Yeatts (2017) estimates that the number of activist investors 
in the U.S. capital market increased to 23 in 2016 compared with just 3 in 2010. 
 
By several measures, the utilities sector has the most vulnerable financial positions to service 
their debt. This could be the case as the utilities sector is going through the restructuring period. 
There has been a shift a mindset among consumers and companies to evolve their energy 
management practices towards using more green energy. These developments include the use of 
renewable energy and technology to manage and reduce consumptions.
63
 As a result, businesses 
and residential consumers have achieved a more substantial reduction in electricity usage. 
Residential consumers aimed at reducing their electricity consumption and support green power. 
Businesses too upheld their commitment to obtaining more energy from renewable energy while 
at the same time decreasing their energy costs. 
 
The Energy sectors’ reinvestment ratio- a measure of future growth– and profitability are lower 
compared to other sectors. These characteristics are coupled with low earnings for this industry.  
Two current major trends in this industry can explain our findings: 1) since June 2014, there has 
been a major extended oil price downturn as a result of supply and demand imbalances. This 
trend has been reversed recently as the U.S. as falling US production helped narrow the supply-
demand gap and cause prices to strengthen.
64
 2) The falling revenue in this sector has some long-
term impacts on the industry’s capital allocation. The continued downturn has reduced investors’ 
appetite to invest in complex and capital-intensive projects. This trend has put some shadow on 
the prospect of growth in this sector. Hence, despite an increase in energy prices and revenue, 
confidence in big capital projects has not re-established yet. This is reflected in our data through 
low profitability and low reinvestment in this sector that could significantly undermine the 
industry’s capacity to service its debts.
65
 
                                                            
63 Deloitte energy and utilities management (2017). 
64 Deloitte, Energy outlook (2016). 
65 Deloitte, Energy outlook (2017). 
Conclusion 
 
Corporate leverage is essential in assessing macro-financial linkages as fluctuations in leverage 
affects the supply of credit to the real economy.
66
 The concern is that standard debt burden 
indicators alone might provide an incomplete picture of corporate debt vulnerabilities. The 
financial structure of corporates- the composition and size of the liabilities and assets on the 
corporates’ financial balance sheet- has been an important factor in determining the sustainability 
of the debt. This pillar, however, has been missing in most of the analysis of corporate debt by 
policymakers.  
 
Understanding the evolving composition of corporate debt, its maturity structure, as well as 
liquidity, is as significant as the total size of the debt.
67
 Corporates with high amounts of 
floating-rate debt such as loans, or with a high portion of the low-quality debt such as high-yield 
bonds, are exposed to a dramatic increase in interest rates.
68
 The sharp rise in short-term interest 
rates could rapidly increase the real cost of debt, especially if a significant share of debt pays 
interest that is linked to a floating rate. This information, however, cannot be captured through 
interest coverage ratios. Most of the sectors have increased their reliance on long-term borrowing 
after the crisis. More importantly, most of the new long-term debt issuance is in the form of 
issuing investment grade, and fixed rate, corporate bonds. This implies that most sectors are not 
as vulnerable to changes in the interest rate as is shown by standard measures of leverage.  
 
The standard debt burden indicators are silent on the origins of the vulnerability to debt. 
However, in examining the vulnerability of the economy to solvency and liquidity risks arising 
from corporate debt positions a more detailed assessment of the composition of corporate debt 
and related activity may be necessary. The policy tools that are designed to help prevent the 
emergence of debt distress in corporate sectors should be built based on three pillars: 1) a 
standardized, and homogenous, analysis of nonfinancial corporate debt across different sectors, 
2) a debt sustainability assessment, including the vulnerability to higher borrowing costs and 
                                                            
66 There are several definitions of macro-financial linkages. In this paper, we adopt BIS definition as the 
two-way interactions between the real economy and the financial sector. 
67 Debt include both debt securities such as bonds and commercial papers and bank loans. 
68 Frame and Steiner (2018). 
changes in macroeconomic environment and 3) a relevant sector-specific analysis based on 
sectors’ business models. This third pillar is currently missing in most of the analysis of the 
corporate debt in the U.S. and other major economies. Taking this factor into account would help 
policymakers to strike a balance between financial stability and economic growth.   
 
Consistent with the standard measures, our data reveals that real estate, energy, and utilities are 
amongst the most vulnerable sectors when taking a capital structure, debt structure, and asset 
characteristics into account. However, these complementary sets of measurements give us a more 
accurate picture of the origins of the vulnerabilities. More importantly, it demonstrates the 
vulnerabilities hidden in sectors such as construction, information, and wholesale trade. These 
risks were masked in the more standard assessment of debt sustainability using leverage and ICR 
ratios as these sectors were amongst the safest industries regarding their financial position. 
 
 
 
References:	
Baum, A., C. Checherita-Westphal, and P. Rother, 2013. “Debt and Growth: New 
Evidence for the Euro Area.” Journal of International Money and Finance 32: 809–21. 
Berg, T., and J . Gider, 2017. "What Explains the Difference in Leverage between Banks 
and Nonbanks?", Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge University 
Press, vol. 52(06), pages 2677-2702, December. 
Bernanke, B., Gertler, M., and S. Gilchrist, 1998. "The Financial Accelerator in a 
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework",  Working Papers 98-03, C.V. Starr Center for 
Applied Economics, New York University. 
 
Bernanke, B., M. Gertler, and S. Gilchrist, 1999. “The Financial Accelerator in a 
Quantitative Business Cycle Framework.” in Handbook of Macroeconomics, Vol. 1, J. B. 
Taylor and M. Woodford (eds), pp. 1341-93, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
Bersin, P., Pelster, P., Schwartz, P., and B. Van der Vyver, 2017. “2017 Deloitte Global 
Human Capital Trends: Rewriting the rules for the digital age.” Deloitte Publications. 
 
Billett, M. T., Dolly King, T.H., and D. C. Mauer, 2007. "Growth Opportunities and the 
Choice of Leverage, Debt Maturity, and Covenants." Journal of Finance, American 
Finance Association, vol. 62(2), pages 697-730, April. 
 
Buttiglione, L., P. R. Lane, L. Reichlin, and V. Reinhart. 2014. “Deleveraging? What 
Deleveraging?”, Geneva Reports on the World Economy 16. Geneva: International 
Center for Monetary and Banking Studies and Centre for Economic Policy Research. 
 
Carlstrom, C. T. and T. Fuerst, 1997. "Agency Costs, Net Worth, and Business 
Fluctuations: A Computable General Equilibrium Analysis." American Economic 
Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(5), pages 893-910, December. 
 
Cantillo, M., and J. Wright, 2000. “How do firms choose their lenders? An empirical 
investigation.” Review of Financial Studies, 13, pp. 155-89. 
 
Cecchetti, S. G., M. S. Mohanty, and F. Zampolli. 2011. “The Real Effects of Debt.” BIS 
WorkingPaper 352, Bank for International Settlements, Basel.  
 
Correa, R., Edge, R. M., and N. Liang, 2017. “A New Dataset of Macroprudential Policy 
Governance Structures.” IFDP Notes. Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System, November 2017, https://doi.org/10.17016/2573-2129.38. 
 
Claessens. S., and M.A. Kose, 2018. "Frontiers of macrofinancial linkages." BIS Papers, 
Bank for International Settlements, number 95, April. 
 
Chui. M., Fender, I., and V. Sushko, 2014. "Risks related to EME corporate balance 
sheets: the role of leverage and currency mismatch." BIS Quarterly Review, Bank for 
International Settlements, September. 
 
De Bondt, G., and D. Marqués-Ibáñez, 2004. "The high-yield segment of the corporate 
bond market: a diffusion modelling approach for the United States, the United 
Kingdom and the euro area." Working Paper Series 313, European Central Bank. 
 
De Fiore, F., and H. Uhlig, 2015. "Corporate Debt Structure and the Financial Crisis." 
Working Paper Series 1759, European Central Bank. 
 
Deloitte Center for Financial Services. 2018. “2018 Real Estate Outlook: Optimize 
opportunities in an ever-changing environment.” Deloitte Publications. 
 
Deloitte Resources Study. 2017. “Energy management: Sustainability and progress.” 
Deloitte Publications. 
 
Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions. 2017. “2017 outlook on oil and gas”, Deloitte 
Publications. 
 
Deloitte Center for Energy Solutions. 2016. “2016 outlook on oil and gas”, Deloitte 
Publications. 
 
Denis, D., and V. Mihov, 2003. “The choice among bank debt, non-bank private debt 
and public debt: Evidence from new corporate borrowings.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 70, pp. 3-28. 
 
Esho, N., Lam, Y., I.G. Sharpe, 2001. “Choice of financing source in international debt 
markets.” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 10, pp. 276-305.  
 
Frame, W. S., and E. Steiner, 2018. "Unconventional Monetary Policy and Risk-
Taking: Evidence from Agency Mortgage REITs." FRB Atlanta Working Paper 2018-8, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta. 
 
Gaspar, V., M. Obstfeld, and R. Sahay, 2016. “Macroeconomic Management When 
Policy Space Is Constrained: A Comprehensive, Consistent, and Coordinated Approach 
to Economic Policy.” Staff Discussion Note 
 
Grenadier, S. R., and A. Malenko, 2011. "Real Options Signaling Games with 
Applications to Corporate Finance." Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial 
Studies, vol. 24(12), pages 3993-4036. 
 
Goyal, V., and F. Packer. 2017. "Corporate leverage in emerging Asia", BIS Papers 
chapters, in: Bank for International Settlements (ed.), Financial systems and the real 
economy, volume 91, pages 65-94 Bank for International Settlements. 
 
Haughwout, A., Lee, A., Tracy, J., and W. Van der Klaauw. 2011. "Real estate investors, 
the leverage cycle, and the housing market crisis." Staff Reports 514, Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2016. “Fiscal Monitor: Debt—Use It Wisely.” 
Washington, October. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2014. “Global Financial Stability Report—Risk 
Taking, Liquidity, and Shadow Banking: Curbing Excess while Promoting Growth.”  
Washington, October. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2017. “Global Financial Stability Report: Is 
Growth at Risk?” Washington, DC, October. 
 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2019. “Global Financial Stability Report: 
Vulnerabilities in a Maturing Credit Cycle.” Washington, DC, April.  
 
Frank, M., and V. K. Goyal, 2009. "Capital Structure Decisions: Which Factors are 
Reliably Important?" MPRA Paper 22525, University Library of Munich, Germany. 
 
James, C., and J. Houston, 1996. "Evolution Or Extinction: Where Are Banks Headed?" 
Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, Morgan Stanley, vol. 9(2), pages 8-23. 
 
Johnson, S. A., 1997. "An Empirical Analysis of the Determinants of Corporate Debt 
Ownership Structure." Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Cambridge 
University Press, vol. 32(01), pages 47-69, March. 
 
Krishnaswami, S., Spindt, P., and V. Subramaniam, 1999. “Information asymmetry, 
monitoring, and the placement structure of corporate debt.” Journal of Financial 
Economics, 51, pp. 407-34. 
 
Krugman, P. 1988. “Financing vs. Forgiving a Debt Overhang.” Journal of 
Development Economics 29 (3): 253–68. 
 
McKinsey Global Institute., 2015. “Debt and (Not Much) Deleveraging.” February. 
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/ 
economic_studies/debt_and_not_much_deleveraging 
 
Moore, J., and & N. Kiyotaki, 1995. "Credit Cycles." Discussion Papers 1995-5, 
Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh. 
OFR. 2017. “Financial Stability Report.” OFR: Office of Financial Research. 
Psillaki, M., and N. Daskalakis, 2009. "Are the determinants of capital structure 
country or firm specific?" Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 319-
333, October. 
 
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales, 1995. “What do we know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data.” Journal of Finance 50(5): 1421{1460. 
 
Reinhart, C. M., V. R. Reinhart, and K. S. Rogoff, 2012. “Public Debt Overhangs: 
Advanced-Economy Episodes since 1800.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 26 (3): 
69–86. 
 
Sachs, J. D, 1989. “Conditionality, Debt Relief, and the Developing Country Debt 
Crisis.” In Developing Country Debt and the World Economy, edited by J. D. Sachs. 
University of Chicago Press. 
 
Tirole, J, 2006. “The Theory of Corporate Finance.” Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Titman, S. and R. Wessels, 1988. “The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice.” The 
Journal of Finance, 43: 1-19.  
 
 
	
 
 
 
 
Appendix: 
 
 Variable Definitions 
 
Vulnerability	
Financial	
Structure	
Variable	 Description	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Indebtedness	and	
Leverage	
	
Debt	Accumulation	
Percentage	change	in	the	cumulated	total	debt	for	each	sector	from	2007	q4	to	
2017	q4.	
Debt	Ratio	
The	total	debt	to	total	assets	(total	equity	plus	total	liabilities).	
	
Leverage	 Total	debt	to	total	equity.	
Debt	Overhang	 Total	debt	to	EBITDA.
69
	
D
e
b
t	
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
	
Long-Term	Debt	to	Total	
Debt	
The	ratio	of	total	long-term	debt	to	total	debt.	
Corporate	Bond	to	Long-
Term	Debt	
The	value	of	total	outstanding	corporate	bond	for	the	sector	to	the	value	of	total	
long-term	debt.	
Bond	With	Maturity	of	less	
than	2	Years	
The	share	of	total	outstanding	bonds	that	matures	before	March	2020.	
Investment	Grade	as	a	Share	
of	the	Total	Bond	
The	value	of	total	investment	grade	bonds	to	total	outstanding	bonds.	
C
a
p
it
a
l	
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
	
	 Fixed	Asset	to	Equity	Ratio	
	
Total	fixed	assets	to	total	equity.
70
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
Debt	Servicing	
Capacity	
	 Interest	Coverage	Ratio	 EBITDA	to	interest	expenses.	
C
o
st
	o
f	
D
e
b
t	 Synthetic	Rating	
Synthetic	ratings	are	obtained	using	firms’	financial	ratios	to	estimate	the	cost	of	
debt.
71
	
Spread	
The	default	spreads	are	achieved	from	traded	bonds	data.	Adding	that	spread	to	a	
risk-free	rate	would	produce	the	pre-tax	cost	of	borrowing	for	a	corporate.	
C
a
p
it
a
l	
S
tr
u
ct
u
re
	
Equity	Reinvestment	Ratio	 (Net	Capital	Expenditures	+	Change	in	Working	Capital)	/	EBIT	(1-t)
72
	
A
ss
e
t	
Q
u
a
li
ty
	
Profitability	 Operating	income	to	total	assets.	
Quick	Ratio	
	
Cash	and	accounts	receivables	to	current	liabilities.
73
	
Tangible	Asset	Ratio	 Fixed	assets	to	total	assets.
74
	
 
 
                                                            
69 EBITDA is earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation, and amortization. 
70 The contribution of equity and debt financing in the fixed assets of the company. It is computed by 
dividing the fixed assets by the stockholders’ equity. 
71 http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile/ratings.htm 
72 Captures the proportion of net income that is reinvested back into the operating assets of the corporate. 
73 Cash also includes cash equivalents and short-term investments. 
74 Fixed asset includes property, plant, and equipment. 
